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Introduction		In	 February	 2014,	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Tuzla,	 an	 industrial	 city	 in	 Bosnia	 and	Herzegovina1,	workers	took	the	streets	and	demonstrated	against	restructuring	schemes	that	had	left	them	unemployed	or	without	any	decent	wage	for	several	months2.	 What	 began	 as	 a	 peaceful	 demonstration	 in	 a	 town	 known	 for	 its	tradition	 of	 multiculturalism	 and	 tolerance	 soon	 turned	 violent.	 There	 were	clashes	 with	 the	 police	 and	 some	 buildings	 were	 set	 on	 fire.	 Other	 cities	 in	Bosnia,	 not	 in	 the	 least	 the	 capital	 Sarajevo,	 followed	 suit	 and	 saw	 a	 similar	succession	of	protests	and	clashes.	What	did	 this	 sudden	 fit	of	 collective	anger	mean?	 For	 many	 Bosnians	 these	 events	 had	 to	 be	 read	 against	 a	 larger	background	 of	 failed	 transition	 and	halted	 democratization.	 The	 protests	were	not	 merely	 about	 growing	 dissatisfaction	 with	 the	 economic	 policies	 and	privatization	schemes	that	had	left	some	firms	in	the	hands	of	corrupt	elites	that	took	decisions	against	the	interests	of	their	employees;	they	were	also	about	the	state	of	the	democracy	more	broadly,	the	general	alienation	that	people	felt	from	those	who	were	elected	to	govern	the	country.	For	many	Bosnians	they	signalled	the	 bankruptcy	 of	 twenty	 years	 of	 intense	 and	 internationally	 guided	democratization.	The	violence	was	not	something	Bosnians	endorsed,	but	many	weren't	surprised	by	it	either:	in	a	post-war	country	where	corruption	is	rife	and	electoral	competition	is	universally	based	on	ethnic	mobilization	there	seems	to	be	a	general	expectation	that	social	unrest	can	derail	quickly.	It	is	with	this	context	in	mind	that	we	have	to	understand	the	events	that	happened	 soon	 after	 the	 violent	 incidents:	 the	 swift	 organizing,	 by	 groups	 of	volunteers,	 of	 a	 number	 of	 citizens'	 assemblies.	 These	 gatherings	 were	 called	
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plenums	 and	 functioned	 as	 temporary	 and	 improvised	 channels	 of	 political	participation	for	ordinary	citizens.	Radically	bottom-up,	radically	open	to	every	citizen,	explicitly	not	tied	to	any	ethnicity,	economic	sector	or	interest	group,	and	not	 aimed	 at	 any	 direct	 engagement	 with	 the	 classic	 channels	 of	 political	participation,	these	plenums	were	a	new	form	of	civic	action	in	Bosnia.	Everyone	who	wanted	 to	 participate	 was	 welcome,	 and	 everyone	who	wanted	 to	 speak	was	welcome	to	speak.	This	was	politics	outside	anything	that	was	usually	seen	as	 politics	 –	 outside	 elections	 and	 even	 outside	 the	 world	 of	 organized	 civil	society.	In	this	article	we	focus	on	the	potential	value	of	incident-driven	forms	of	civic	democratization,	of	which	the	plenums	in	Bosnia	are	an	important	–	albeit	temporary	–	example,	in	the	context	of	post-conflict	democratization	attempts.		So	 far	 democratization	 literature	 has	 focused	 mostly	 on	 the	 classical	channels	 of	 political	 participation,	 especially	 in	 the	 context	 of	 discussions	 on	international	 democracy	promotion	 and	 state-building3,4,5,6.	 In	places	 that	have	experienced	 ethnic	 conflict,	 such	 attempts	 usually	 mean	 the	 formation	 of	 a	system	of	government	that	tries	to	appease	the	formerly	warring	factions.	Such	strong	emphasis	on	(one	might	even	say	preoccupation	with)	conflict-settlement	comes	with	a	price:	lessons	from	democratization	processes	in	more	established	and	 peaceful	 democracies	 are	 usually	 not	 taken	 to	 be	 relevant.	 It	 is	 as	 if	 only	advanced	democracies	should	engage	in	new	forms	of	citizens’	participation,	and	as	 if	only	established	democracies	can	afford	themselves	to	think	about	how	to	move	 beyond	 the	 limits	 of	 elections,	 party	 politics	 and	 organized	 civil	 society.	Post-conflict	 societies	 apparently	 need	 to	 stick	 to	 old	 recipes	 for	democratization,	 even	 if	 they	 don’t	 lead	 to	much	 result.	We	 believe,	 however,	that	 the	plenums	 in	Bosnia	demonstrate	 the	 importance	of	 imaging	democracy	differently	also	in	post-conflict	places.	Moreover,	they	give	us	cause	to	give	more	attention	 to	democratic	 experimentation	 in	post-conflict	places	 in	our	 thinking	about	 democracy	 more	 in	 general.	 Violent	 incidents	 in	 post-conflict	 societies	expose	the	need	to	introduce	new	forms	of	democracy	there	and	they	show	how	urgent	 it	 might	 be	 to	 assess	 critically	 current	 notions	 of	 democracy	 and	democratization	even	 in	established	democracies.	 In	 the	case	of	Bosnia,	we	see	how	 new	 forms	 of	 democratization	 are	 enacted	 and	 staged	 by	 citizens	
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themselves,	 outside	 of	 any	 initiative	 by	 the	 state,	 international	 community	 or	organized	 civil	 society.	Of	 course,	 these	plenums	alone	 couldn’t	 be	 expected	 to	provide	a	 sufficient	 remedy	 for	 the	dysfunctions	of	 the	Bosnian	 state.	But	 they	did	 show	 that	 experiments	 in	 citizens-driven	 democracy	 are	 not	 merely	 the	expression	of	a	naïve	longing	for	some	far-off	ideal;	they	can	be	practical	ways	to	set	minds	 in	motion	and	move	matters	 forward	towards	 that	 ideal,	even	 in	 the	most	unlikely	of	circumstances.	In	the	first	section	of	this	article	we	reflect	on	why	the	classical	recipes	for	democratization	have	failed	in	Bosnia.	We	start	with	the	Dayton	accords	but	take	also	 a	 broader	 literature	 on	 civil	 society	 and	 international	 supervision	 into	account.	Not	 only	 has	democratization	been	halted	by	 ethnic	 constitutionalism	and	the	politics	of	transition,	corruption	and	partycracy	that	has	emerged	from	it;	it	has	also	been	hindered	by	the	narrow	ways	in	which	organized	civil	society,	supported	by	international	agencies,	has	operated	so	far.		In	the	second	part	of	the	article	we	offer	an	overview	of	the	developments	after	 February	2014.	What	were	 the	 plenums,	 and	how	 should	we	understand	their	value	 in	the	context	of	 the	constraints	 inherent	to	classic	democratization	strategies?	 Our	 comments	 are	 based	 on	 fieldwork	 in	 Sarajevo	 and	 Tuzla	 in	February	 2014	 –	 work	 that	 included	 interviews	 with	 activists	 and	 participant	observation	 at	 the	 Sarajevo	 plenum	 meeting	 of	 February	 17th	 and	 the	 street	protests	 in	 the	 days	 following.	 We	 also	 conducted	 interviews	 with	 Bosnian	activists	 involved	 in	 the	 protests	 and	 plenums	 on	 several	 occasions	 over	 the	course	of	20147.	In	 the	 third	part	of	 the	article	we	broaden	 the	 scope,	offer	 a	 theoretical	interpretation	 of	 the	 problem	 of	 democratic	 exhaustion,	 and	 see	 the	 case	 of	Bosnia	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 wider	 reflection	 on	 the	 role	 of	 incidents	 and	imaginations	in	the	advancement	of	democratization	in	Europe	and	beyond.		 	
1.	Democratization	failed	
	
A	constitution	and	its	discontents		
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A	 number	 of	 social	 scientists	 have	 suggested	 the	 term	 “ethnopolis”	 to	 describe	the	 internationally	 supervised	 constitutional	 arrangements	 made	 through	 the	Dayton	 Peace	 Agreements	 (and	 adjusted	 in	 later	 stages)	 and	 the	 constraining	features	of	 the	electoral	 competition	 that	has	been	built	on	 that	basis.	Mujkić8,	for	 example,	 uses	 this	 term	 to	 talk	 about	 the	 tendency	 towards	 exclusive	collectivist	 representation	 and	 the	 strong	 emphasis	 on	 ethnic	 affiliation	 that	 is	pervasive	across	the	political	system.	These	traits	discourage	civic	initiatives	that	crosscut	ethnic	divides,	and	as	a	result	citizens	feel	disempowered.	Free	and	fair	elections	only	encourage	them	to	frame	their	political	preferences	even	more	in	ethnic	ways.		How	has	Bosnia	arrived	in	this	situation?	After	the	war	Bosnia	was	given	a	system	of	“power-sharing,”	a	form	of	democracy	that	guaranteed	the	different	recognized	groups	an	equal	share	of	power	(our	discussion	 is	based	on	a	more	elaborate	 treatment	 of	 the	 topic	 in	 Touquet	 and	 Vermeersch	 2007)9.	 We	 can	characterize	 the	 system	 by	 locating	 it	 on	 a	 spectrum	 between	 two	 ideal-type	systems	of	power-sharing:	consociationalism	(a	term	mostly	associated	with	the	work	 of	 Lijphart)10	and	 integrative	 power-sharing	 (a	 term	 mostly	 associated	with	 the	 work	 of	 Horowitz)11,12,13.These	 two	 ideal	 types	 differ	 mostly	 as	 to	whether	and	how	ethnic	differentiation	is	built	into	the	electoral	system.	Lijphart	has	 generally	 emphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 recognizing	 ethnic	 groups	 as	 the	cornerstones	 of	 government.	 Ethnic	 conflicts,	 in	 his	 view	need	 to	 be	 solved	by	stimulating	 processes	 of	 cooperation	 between	 elites	 organized	 in	 institutions	that	 explicitly	 acknowledge	 the	 differences	 between	 ethnic	 groups.	 In	 a	consociational	system,	therefore,	governmental	power	is	shared	by	the	different	ethnic	 groups	 that	 were	 previously	 part	 of	 the	 conflict,	 and	 sharing	 happens	through,	 for	example,	a	grand	coalition	 in	parliament	or	a	common	presidency;	each	group	has	a	certain	degree	of	autonomy	(groups	decide	for	themselves	on	issues	which	are	not	of	common	interest);	there	is	proportionality	on	all	 levels,	including	 in	 the	 civil	 service	 and	 the	 distribution	 of	 public	 funds;	 and	 there	 is	veto	 power	 for	 minorities.	 Horowitz’s	 integrative	 option,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	starts	from	the	premise	that	institutions	need	to	be	designed	to	encourage	intra-ethnic	competition	and,	therefore,	he	advocates	a	system	that	forces	ethnic	and	
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nationalist	parties	to	soften	their	stances	and	tout	voters	from	across	the	ethnic	spectrum	before	government	formation.		Although	some	of	the	provisions	of	the	Dayton	Agreements	could	be	read	as	 an	 attempt	 to	 introduce	 integrative	 elements	 (such	 as,	 for	 example,	 its	provisions	 dealing	 with	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 return	 of	 refugees	 in	 order	 to	restore	the	multi-ethnic	composition	of	certain	regions),	on	the	whole	the	system	is	 mainly	 a	 consociationalist.	 This	 solution	 was	 preferred	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	dominant	view	that	 the	nature	of	 the	conflict	had	been	ethnic	and	that	none	of	the	ethnic	parties	could	claim	a	victory.	The	negotiators	at	the	time	tried	to	meet	the	wishes	of	the	Bosnian	Serbs	on	the	one	hand	(who	wanted	a	republic	of	their	own)	 as	well	 as	 the	 Bosniaks	 and	 the	 Croats	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 (who	were	 in	favor	 of	 a	 multi-ethnic	 state).	 The	 most	 significant	 consociational	 element	introduced	by	Dayton	was	the	strong	decentralization	of	government.	As	a	result,	the	central	institutions	of	the	Bosnian	state	are	very	weak,	whereas	the	regional	entities	 (the	 Bosnian-Croat	 Federation,	 and	 within	 that	 the	 cantons	 of	 the	Bosnian-Croat	Federation,	and	the	Republika	Srpska)	have	relative	wide	powers.	As	 the	 most	 important	 governing	 bodies	 on	 the	 federal	 level	 the	 system	introduced	a	collective	presidency,	a	bicameral	federal	parliament	and	a	council	of	ministers.	Through	 its	 emphasis	 on	 power-sharing	 mechanisms	 Dayton	pragmatically	 recognized	 segregated	 ethnic	 enclaves	 as	 the	 central	 loci	 of	political	 authority.	 The	 structure	 of	 the	 Bosnian	 state	 turned	 out	 to	 be	 highly	decentralized	and	asymmetrical:	the	Federation	has	been	split	up	in	cantons	and	municipalities,	 whereas	 there	 is	 no	 such	 division	 in	 Republika	 Srpska14.	 The	overall	 result	 is	 that	 the	 biggest	 concentration	 of	 power	 is	 to	 be	 found	 on	 the	levels	that	are	deemed	the	most	ethnically	homogenous	and	where	the	chances	of	 conflicts	 arising	 are	 deemed	 to	 be	 the	 smallest:	 the	 level	 of	 the	 entity	 in	Republika	 Sprska	 and	 level	 of	 the	 cantons	 or	municipalities	 in	 the	 Federation.	Other	 elements	 of	 the	 power-sharing	 principle	 that	 make	 Bosnia	 into	 an	ethnicized	 state	 are	 the	 minority	 veto	 for	 vital	 issues	 and	 the	 principle	 of	proportionality	on	all	levels15.	It	 is	 clear	 that	we	 need	 to	 understand	 the	 introduction	 of	 this	 complex	power-sharing	system	with	its	fine-tuned	territorial	divisions	and	ethnic	rules	as	
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related	 to	 an	 overwhelming	 concern	 to	 tame	 ethnic	 groups	 and	 end	 (and	prevent)	ethnic	conflict.	But	with	this	taming	and	prevention	has	come	a	deeply	entrenched	ethnicized	institutional	framework	that	has	not	only	turned	out	to	be	useful	for	those	who	want	to	build	their	power	on	ethnic	constituencies	but	also	spectacularly	ill-fit	to	foster	further	democratization	and	crassly	inapt	to	create	country-wide	programs	 for	 socio-economic	 justice.	As	a	 result	mass	discontent	and	 protest	 has	 emerged	 on	 themes	 that	 crosscut	 ethnic	 divisions.	 And	 not	surprisingly,	any	insurgency	against	any	type	of	policy,	no	matter	on	what	level	of	 government,	 has	 often	 been	 faced	 with	 ethnic	 recuperation	 on	 some	 level.	Even	when	concerns	underlying	protest	movements	have	not	be	inspired	by	any	‘ethnic	 claims’,	 they	 have	 been	 easily	 translated	 or	 reduced	 into	 such	 ethnic	claims	by	governing	elites	and	the	media.	Translating	social	dissatisfaction	into	ethno-national	 resentment	 has	 been	 a	 key	 strategy	 for	 the	 governing	 elites	throughout	the	post-Dayton	era16,	and	one	can	easily	see	why	this	has	been	the	case.	 The	 current	 system	 simply	 encourages	 such	 translation	 because	 through	such	an	operation	contentious	issues	can	be	evacuated	outside	of	the	domain	of	country-wide	responsibilities	and	solidarities.	And	this,	in	turn,	allows	politicians	to	refocuses	on	the	competition	between	the	territorial	units	of	the	Bosnian	state	–	the	building	blocks	of	the	electoral	system	–	which	are	also	ethnic	units.		The	 question	 then	 is,	 to	 what	 extent	 does	 the	 straight	 jacket	 of	 the	institutional	 system	 in	Bosnia	 still	 allow	room	 for	 further	democratization?	Or,	more	 accurately,	 what	 types	 of	 political	 or	 social	 action	 may	 escape	 or	 move	beyond	 the	 logic	of	 the	ethnopolis?	Perhaps	 there	 is	 something	 to	be	expected	from	non-ethnic	political	parties	and	civil	society	initiatives?		
Outside	 the	 ethnopolis:	 attempts	 to	 move	 politics	 and	 social	 protest	 beyond	
ethnicized	structures		After	 the	 fall	 of	 the	 Berlin	 wall	 a	 large	 literature	 discussed	 recipes	 for	democratization	 and	 market	 transition.	 Linz	 and	 Stepan17,	 for	 example,	 talk	about	 five	 necessary	 domains:	 a	 free	 civil	 society,	 an	 autonomous	 and	 valued	political	 society	 (with	parties,	 elections,	 legislatures,	 etc.),	 rule	of	 law,	 a	usable	bureaucracy,	 and	 an	 institutionalized	 economic	 society	 that	mediates	 between	
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the	 state	 and	 the	 market.	 But	 in	 several	 ways,	 the	 Bosnian	 story	 shows	 that	today,	 twenty	 years	 after	 Dayton,	 democratization	 needs	 to	 be	 regarded	 as	 a	much	more	elusive	affair.	We	need	to	look	beyond	Linz	and	Stepan’s	checklist.			 This	 is	 clear,	 for	 example,	 from	 considering	 parties	 and	 elections.	 Party	politics	 and	 elections	 in	 Bosnia	 have	 been	 overseen	 and	 monitored	 by	international	agents	for	two	decades	now,	but	still	party	competition	can	hardly	be	seen	as	key	contributor	 to	 the	 further	development	of	a	healthy	democracy.	Party	membership	in	Bosnia	may	be	relatively	widespread	but	this	is	obviously	linked	 to	 the	 large	amount	of	 clientelism	and	corruption	 that	happens	 through	political	 parties18.	 At	 first	 sight,	 the	 country	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 suffer	 greatly	from	 the	mass	withdrawal	 from	electoral	 politics	 and	political	 parties	 that	has	characterized	 Western	 liberal	 democracies	 over	 the	 recent	 years19	(turnout	figures	during	Bosnian	elections	may	be	low	but	not	as	low	as	in	Western	liberal	democracies);	but	what	has	come	instead	is	not	less	worrying:	party	involvement	for	the	wrong	reasons.			 There	 have	 been	 attempts	 to	 escape	 this	 vicious	 circle,	 notably	 some	political	 parties	 themselves.	 Some	 political	 parties	 have	 sought	 to	 go	 beyond	ethnic	divisions	(and	beyond	the	ethnocratic	logic	of	party	competition),	but	they	have	generally	not	fared	well.	While	the	Social	Democratic	SDP	has	had	members	in	both	entities	and	has	nominally	been	multi-ethnic	for	quite	some	years	now,	its	 major	 bases	 of	 support	 have	 remained	 limited	 to	 the	 urban	 centres	 of	 the	Bosniak-Croat	Federation;	in	2008	it	effectively	sided	with	the	Bosniak	political	parties	SDA	and	SBiH	during	constitutional	reform	talks20.	Opposition	party	Naša	Stranka	(NS)	so	far	represents	the	most	successful	attempt	at	mobilizing	cross-ethnically	–	it	entered	politics	during	the	local	elections	of	2008	and	went	on	to	make	a	difference	in	some	municipalities	–	but	on	a	country-wide	scale	the	party	has	remained	firmly	stuck	in	the	margins.	Interestingly,	NS	has	tried	to	mobilize	citizens	 not	 only	 cross-ethnically	 but	 also	 against	 Bosnian	 party	 politics	 as	 a	whole,	or	more	precisely,	against	the	system	of	ethnicized	clientalism,	patronage	and	 corruption	 that,	 on	 a	 practical	 level,	 party	 politics	 has	 become.	 This	 has	proven	a	difficult	and	paradoxical	stance	for	NS	to	uphold:	while	being	a	political	party	itself	it	tried	to	mobilize	on	the	basis	of	a	call	of	resistance	against	all	party	politics21		
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	 One	 could	 therefore	 argue	 that	 the	 problem	 of	 Bosnian	 party	 politics	extends	 the	 problem	 of	 ethnicization	 –	 the	 ramifications	 go	much	 further	 and	must	make	one	wonder	if	any	type	of	democratizing	reform	can	ever	be	expected	from	a	political	party.	The	parliamentary	elections	of	October	2014,	for	example,	brought	some	of	the	usual	elites	back	to	power,	and	these	were	to	a	large	extent	once	 again	 those	 elites	 supported	 by	 the	 same	 ethnic	 constituencies	 as	 in	previous	elections.	But	the	deeper	issue	is	that	even	if	these	powerholders	would	not	be	genuine	ethnonationalists,	 they	would	still	have	almost	no	 incentives	 to	break	 the	 logic	 of	 the	 ethnocratic	 system;	 it	 simply	 offers	 them	 too	much	 of	 a	comfortable	array	of	possibilities	to	gain	access	to	power.	And	hence	the	policy-making	status	quo	remains.	As	Bieber	formulated	it	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2014	elections:	“A	central	feature	of	Bosnian	politics	that	has	contributed	to	the	sense	of	disempowerment	among	many	citizens	has	been	the	perception	that	nobody	ever	loses	office	and	everybody	is	in	power	somewhere”22.		 If	 party	 politics	 doesn’t	 hold	 much	 promise	 for	 the	 advancement	 of	democratization,	 perhaps	 we	 should	 look	 at	 civil	 society?	 But	 a	 solution	providing	civic	empowerment	seems	not	 to	be	 found	 in	the	world	of	organized	civil	 society	 either.	 Not	 only	 have	 many	 NGOs,	 like	 political	 parties,	 been	obsessed	by	identity	politics23,	they	have	also	created	a	self-sustaining	economic	system	 that	 has	 lost	 the	 ability	 to	 critically	 address	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 party	politics.	 Some	 speak	 of	 the	 “NGO-ization”	 of	 Bosnia	 –	 i.e.	 the	 expansion	 of	 an	internationally	 supported	NGO	sector	 that	has	 come	 to	 fill	 the	gap	of	 a	 lacking	civil	 sphere	with	massive	 international	support	and	has	 thereby	also,	 in	a	way,	created	 the	 impression	 that	 the	 only	 legitimate	way	 of	 organizing	 such	 a	 civil	sphere	is	through	foreign	aid	programs.		 Small	 wonder	 then	 that	 social	 protests	 have	 become	 so	 important	 for	many	 people	who	 hope	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 democratic	 culture	 on	 a	 larger	 scale.	Until	 recently,	 however,	 the	 story	 of	 mass	 protests	 as	 a	 potential	 source	 of	democratization	was	 not	 a	 happy	 story	 either.	 The	 trouble	with	 social	 protest	was	that	 it	was	easily	stripped	from	its	power	to	build	cross-ethnic	support	by	media	and	politicians	who	reframed	such	protests	as	ethnic.	They	could	in	many	cases	do	that	so	easily	because	the	causes	brought	to	the	fore	by	these	protesters	where	 issues	 that	 had	 already	 been	 framed	 in	 ethnic	 terms	 through	 party	
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competition;	 these	were	 issues	 that	were,	on	a	deeper	 level,	already	ethnicized	before	 they	 could	even	become	a	 source	of	protest.	 In	 June	2013,	 for	 example,	there	were	mass	protests	against	the	government’s	failure	to	adopt	legislation	on	citizens’	ID	(the	so-called	“JMBG	movement”,	named	after	the	name	of	the	law	on	
jedinstveni	matični	broj	građana	–	unique	citizens’	ID	number).	But	this	had	been	an	ethnically	contentious	issue	in	parliament	(a	dispute	about	politicians	of	the	Republika	Srpska	and	the	Federation	about	whether	the	new	regulation	should	include	 references	 to	 entity	 borders)	 already	 before	 the	 protests	 started;	 and	while	 the	 protests	 explicitly	 sought	 to	 overcome	 ethnic	 divisions,	 they	 didn’t	manage	 to	 maintain	 this	 image	 in	 the	 context	 of	 strong	 party	 recuperation	tactics24.		
2.	Incidents,	accidents,	and	plenums		How	are	the	plenums	that	began	in	February	2014	different?	Did	they	offer	more	hope	 and	make	 the	 advancement	 towards	 a	 fully	 functioning	 democracy	more	realistic?		 	The	incidents	that	preceded	the	plenums	did	not,	at	the	time,	give	much	reason	 to	suspect	 that	 they	would	 increase	chances	 for	substantive	democratic	reform.	 To	 be	 sure,	 they	 were	 large-scale	 and	 massive,	 but	 that	 wasn’t	 what	made	them	qualitatively	different	from	previous	protests.	Indeed,	in	some	ways,	the	protests	of	February	2014	and	the	violent	clashes	that	 followed	can	still	be	catalogued	 under	 the	 same	 rubric	 as	 earlier	 episodes	 of	 social	 unrest.	 What	drove	 these	 protests	might	 not	 have	 been	 in	 the	 first	 place	 a	 direct	 attack	 on	Dayton	as	a	principle,	but	like	earlier	instances	of	protest,	they	were	expressions	of	a	deep	distrust	in	government	as	a	whole,	and	in	particular,	 in	the	principles	and	 practices	 of	 economic	 policy	 implemented	 by	 these	 governments.	 The	demonstrations	 and	 strikes	 started	 in	 response	 to	 dysfunctions	 at	 specific	factories	 (especially	 in	Tuzla,	 in	 companies	 such	 as	Dita,	 Polihem,	Guming	 and	Konjuh),	but	they	soon	caught	on	a	larger	symbolic	meaning	as	anti-government	protests.	They	started	to	represent	general	 feelings	of	discontent	not	only	with	factory	management	boards	but	also	with	the	economic	and	political	 transition	policies	 of	 the	 various	 governments	 that	 had	 allowed	 and	 stimulated	
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dysfunctional	 governance	 at	 the	 level	 of	 the	 companies.	 Earlier	 protest	movements	 in	 Bosnia	 had	 followed	 a	 similar	 trajectory:	 dissatisfaction	 with	 a	particular	issue	had	merged	into	broader	protests	directed	against	(local,	entity-level,	state-wide	and	international)	governmental	agencies.		 But	 in	this	case,	partly	because	of	 the	heavy	violence	–	which	was	much	heavier	 than	 in	any	earlier	episode	of	social	unrest	–	and	partly	because	of	 the	active	concern	of	various	activists	who	had	been	close	observers	of	new	styles	of	protests	 in	 other	post-Yugoslav	 countries	 (student	 demonstrations	 and	occupy	movements	 in	Zagreb	and	Belgrade),	 the	trajectory	didn’t	stop	there.	The	short	wave	 of	 demonstrations	 and	 violence	 was	 followed,	 not	 only	 by	 the	 usual	attempts	 at	 ethnic	 reframing	 by	 powerholders	 and	 other	 ethnopolitical	entrepreneurs,	 but	 also	by	 a	 sustained	 attempt	 at	 building	 a	novel	 tradition	of	democratic	 politics	 parallel	 to	 elections,	 party	 politics	 and	 mass	 protest	 –	primarily	 in	 Tuzla,	 where	 the	 strikes	 of	 workers	 had	 started	 and	 where	 the	violence	 had	 been	 most	 visible,	 but	 later	 on	 also	 in	 Sarajevo,	 Zenica,	 Mostar,	Jajce,	and	Brčko.			 People	 gathered	 in	 public	 spaces	 where	 they	 could	 speak	 their	 mind	before	a	public	of	peers	on	any	topic	they	deemed	important.	The	technique	was	akin	 to	 that	 of	 “open	 space	 technology”25,	 but	 it	 also	 relied	 implicitly	 on	 some	deliberative	 traditions	 from	 Yugoslav	 times	 (the	 self-management	 board	meetings).	 One	 of	 the	 facilitators	 of	 the	meetings	 in	 Tuzla	 has	 described	 these	plenums	 as	 “public	 gatherings,	 open	 to	 any	 citizen,	 through	 which	 collective	decisions	 and	 demands	 can	 be	 made	 and	 action	 taken,	 beyond	 guarantees	 of	leadership.	 They	 are	 open,	 direct,	 and	 transparent	 democracy	 in	 practice.”23.	Every	 citizen	 was	 invited	 to	 participate,	 and	 everyone	 was	 given	 the	 right	 to	speak	 two	 minutes	 about	 anything	 they	 wanted	 to	 talk	 about.	 The	 method	chosen	 for	 this	 political	 action,	 and	 the	 radical	 openness	 undergirding	 the	organization	of	it,	made	it	stand	out	of	the	earlier	protest	repertoire.	Eric	Gordy	describes	the	 importance	of	 the	plenums	as	 follows:	“Through	the	formation	of	citizens’	 plenums	 generating	 and	 articulating	 demands	 by	 means	 of	 a	 direct	democratic	procedure,	the	protest	movement	achieved	two	milestones:	it	moved	protests	away	from	the	streets	where	they	were	vulnerable	to	being	discredited,	and	 it	 took	 the	 production	 of	 the	 movement	 agenda	 out	 of	 the	 hands	 of	 the	
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dominant	 political	 parties	 where	 they	 could	 be	 detourned	 and	 deprived	 of	significance”23.			 Of	 course,	 this	did	not	mean	 that	 there	were	no	attempts	done	 to	bring	the	 incidents,	 the	 clashes	 and	 the	 plenums	 back	 onto	 more	 familiar	 ethnic	terrain.	As	Emir	Hodžić	writes:	“politicians	[were]	fostering	ethnic	tensions	and	most	 of	 the	 mainstream	 media	 [were]	 reporting	 on	 hooliganism,	 attacks	 on	democracy,	coup	d’état	and	other	types	of	insidious	nonsense,	[while]	volunteers	proceeded	 to	 find	 a	 location	 for	 the	 first	 citizens’	 plenum.”23.	 But	 what	 made	matters	 different	 for	 the	 plenums	was	 that	 they	 had	 something	more	 to	 offer	then	merely	mass	protest	and	party	politics,	and	for	that	very	reason	managed	to	escape	some	of	the	preformatted	protest-politician	scenarios.		During	 the	gatherings	 citizens	 talked	about	policies	 and	 reforms	–	most	notably	 they	 brought	 socio-economic	 issues	 high	 on	 to	 the	 agenda	 –	 and	recommendations	were	made	and	communicated	to	government	representatives	(and	 in	 some	 cases	 they	had	 some	 level	 of	 influence);	 but	 the	 significance	 and	importance	of	the	plenums	lies	also	with	their	format:	the	fact	that	they	offered	a	novel	 method	 of	 politics	 –	 indeed	 redefined	 politics	 –	 created	 trust	 among	participants,	 and	 provided	 the	 space	 to	 facilitate	 talk	 among	 equal	 citizens.	However	brief,	they	managed	to	create	a	specific	site	for	democratic	politics	–	a	place	of	democratic	refuge	–	where	“the	position	of	victimhood	was	discarded”	and	where	 a	 “renewed	 enthusiasm	 and	 energy”23	 for	 politics	was	 created	 and	experienced.		 	
3.	 Incident-driven	 democratization:	 from	 pressure	 valves	 to	 imaging	
democracy		It’s	worthwhile	to	try	and	read	the	story	of	the	plenums	against	the	background	of	 the	 traditional	 literature	on	democratic	participation.	For	many	scholars	 the	creation	of	a	democratic	system	by	necessity	entails	the	incorporation	of	various	“pressure	 valves.”	 Even	 if	 social	 movements	 or	 protest	 groups	 were	 mostly	ignored	in	the	initial	drawing	plans	for	the	democratic	edifice,	 they	are	by	now	considered	essential	coping	stones	at	the	central	axis	preventing	it	from	collapse.	In	his	book	Contre-démocratie	the	French	political	theorist	Pierre	Rosanvallon26,	
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for	example,	argues	that	countervailing	powers	are	necessary	to	compensate	for	the	 low	 levels	 of	 faith	 contemporary	 citizens	 have	 in	 traditional	 forms	 of	democratic	representation.	If	we	have	social	movements	to	take	tabs	on	political	parties	 or	 successfully	monitor	 corruption,	we	 can	 trust	 that	 the	 “rascals”	will	restrain	themselves27.	We	find	a	similar	line	of	thinking	in	the	work	of	Harvard	scholar	 Pippa	 Norris28,	 who	 made	 the	 point	 that	 data	 displaying	 diminishing	voter	turnout	or	decreasing	political	trust	don’t	tell	us	the	whole	story;	there	has	been	a	steep	 increase	 in	other	 forms	of	political	activity,	 such	as	petitioning	or	demonstrating.	 Norris	 speaks	 of	 a	 “democratic	 phoenix”	 that	 arises	 from	 its	ashes:	 this	 is	 democracy	 but	 in	 a	 new	 form.	 Although	 none	 of	 these	 authors	discards	the	need	to	have	a	well-functioning	traditional	representational	system,	they	claim	that	if	such	a	system	is	encapsulated	in	a	thick	duvet	of	other	political	activities,	it	will	keep	functioning	even	if	it	is	trimmed	to	the	bone.		But	 what	 does	 that	 say	 about	 Bosnia?	 It	 seems	 the	 main	 currents	 of	thinking	 about	 the	 hidden	 resilience	 of	 democracy	 are	 empirically	 based	 on	western	democracies	and	some	of	their	central	tenets	seem	to	come	down	when	we	try	to	apply	them	to	new	democracies.		First	of	all,	authors	such	as	Pippa	Norris27	or	Russel	Dalton29	insist	(on	the	basis	 of	 elaborate	 survey	material)	 that,	 even	 though	 citizens	 are	 less	 likely	 to	vote	 or	 participate	 in	 traditional	 political	 forms,	 their	 distrust	 only	 pertains	 to	those	who	do	the	governing	(the	actors);	their	faith	in	the	underlying	democratic	structure,	 in	contrast,	 is	stable,	or	even	increasing.	Indeed,	they	find	that	young	citizens	 in	 the	 US	 and	 Europe	 are	 among	 the	 most	 ardent	 adherents	 of	 the	democratic	 ideal.	 But	 as	 we	 explained	 earlier,	 in	 Bosnia	 there	 are	 multiple	indicators	 to	show	that	many	citizens	have	 few	 illusions	about	 the	system	as	a	whole.	A	survey	from	2014,	conducted	with	support	from	the	EU,	shows	that	in	Bosnia	 distrust	 of	 the	 state	 government	 was	 at	 almost	 80%	 and	 distrust	 of	political	parties	almost	90%30.	Such	high	numbers	indicate	a	deep	malaise	in	the	functioning	of	current	democratic	institutions	in	Bosnia.		Second,	 even	 though	 citizens	 in	 Western	 Europe	 will	 act	 through	organizations	and	movements	 that	are	not	part	of	 the	national	political	 system	sensu	 stricto,	 the	 aim	 in	 the	 end	 is	 still	 to	 influence	 the	 traditional	 political	representatives.	Swedish	political	scientists	Narud	and	Esaiasson31	use	the	term	
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‘between-election	democracy’	to	refer	to	the	kind	of	democracy	that	lets	citizens	interact	with	their	elected	representatives	through	all	kinds	of	parallel	channels.	This	 implies	 that	 these	 channels	 (such	 as	 NGOs	 or	 institutionally	 sanctioned	social	movements)	are	considered	 legitimate	second-order	representatives	and	political	 representatives	 will	 listen	 to	 citizens’	 demands	 voiced	 through	 them.	When	citizens	lack	faith	in	social	movements	and	discern	no	possibility	to	have	any	 impact	 through	 them,	 this	 alternative	 route	 to	 democratic	 representation	becomes	a	very	dusty	road	indeed.		Due	 to	 the	 pervasive	 ethnicization	 of	 all	 public	 life	 in	 Bosnia,	 these	movements	 there,	 including	 broad	 forms	 of	 “civil	 society,”	 are	 seldom	 seen	 as	representative	 of	 any	 group	 broader	 than	 an	 ethnically	 defined	 constituency.	Moreover,	due	to	the	colonization	of	civil	society	by	international	organizations	and	donors,	 faith	 in	 these	movements	and	organizations	 is	much	 lower	 than	 in	Western	democracies,	and	often	they	are	seen	as	representatives	of	the	interest	of	these	international	organizations	rather	than	of	those	of	the	citizens	of	Bosnia.	In	former	communist	states	civil	society	in	general	has	less	support	and	impact	on	 politics	 and	 policymaking	 than	 in	 Western	 societies,	 but	 even	 by	 those	standards	the	problem	in	Bosnia	 is	stark.	As	Rupnik32	remarked	with	regard	to	CEE	countries,	the	lack	of	“corps	intermédiariers”	in	these	countries	means	there	is	 no	 real	 counterweight	 when	 things	 go	 wrong	 within	 formal	 institutions	 or	when	 the	 country	 takes	 a	more	 authoritarian	 turn.	 In	CEE	 countries,	 the	 focus	has	 been	on	 installing	 constitutional	 democracy	 and	 free	markets,	 but	without	citizens’	 participation	 and	 a	 strong	 civil	 society,	 the	 democratization	 process	becomes	 a	 precarious	 exercise.	 Both	 organized	 civil	 society	 and	 citizens’	participation	 are	 indispensable	 for	 perpetuating	 democracy	 after	 it	 is	 formally	installed.	In	the	Bosnian	case,	the	survey	mentioned	above	also	found	that	half	of	the	 population	 has	 only	 ‘low’	 or	 ‘absolutely	 no’	 faith	 in	NGOs	 or	 humanitarian	organizations.	In	Bosnia	the	so-called	democratic	phoenix	has	clipped	wings.		All	of	this	is	to	show	that	the	literature	on	democratic	representation	and	social	movements	 seems	 to	have	no	 real	 answer	as	 to	what	happens	 if	 a	 crisis	occurs	 in	 a	 situation	 where	 the	 “pressure	 valve”	 option	 is	 not	 present.	 In	situations	 where	 the	 state	 is	 not	 receptive	 to	 input	 by	movements	 (or	 in	 this	case,	 movements	 are	 just	 not	 deemed	 relevant	 for	 policy	 drafting),	 social	
	 14	
movement	literature	predicts	a	higher	occurrence	of	more	intense	and	possibly	even	 violent	 protest33.	 This	 is	 exactly	what	we	 have	 seen	 in	 the	 Bosnian	 case,	where	 workers	 took	 the	 streets	 in	 an	 unorganized	 fashion	 and	 some	 rioters	attacked	government	buildings.	But	the	demonstrations	of	February	2014	–	and	indeed,	 all	 the	 social	 protests	 that	 had	 preceded	 them	 –	 hardly	 gave	 hope	 to	democratic	activists	that	they	would	enable	them	to	break	the	existing	gridlock	of	the	etnopolis.		Hence	 the	 current	 stalemate:	 the	 social	 crisis	 has	 mobilized	 people	 in	various	ways	 but	 has	 offered	 them	 few	 (perhaps	 no)	 democratic	 tools	 to	 send	their	contention	into	the	channels	of	the	policymaking	process	that	might	lead	to	meaningful	reforms.	One	could	call	this	a	situation	of	“democratic	exhaustion”34:	the	 belief	 in	 democracy	 as	 an	 ideal	 is	 still	 somehow	present,	 especially	 among	activists,	 but	 after	many	 years	 of	 all	 sorts	 of	movement	 activities,	 citizens	 feel	they	 have	 not	 moved	 much	 further	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 a	 well-functioning	democratic	state.	Usually,	when	an	incident	or	social	crisis	occurs	in	a	political	environment	that	 suffers	 from	 “democratic	 exhaustion,”	 it	 leaves	 activists	with	 two	options:	they	 can	 either	 persevere	 in	 their	 hope	 on	 the	 traditional	 linkage	 function	between	 movement	 and	 political	 representational	 system,	 or	 they	 can	 divert	from	democracy	as	an	ideal.	In	Bosnia	the	attempt	has	been	to	find	yet	another	way.	 This	 has	 hardly	 been	 self-evident.	 During	 a	 workshop	 in	 Amsterdam,	activists	and	scholars	Nenad	Stojanović	and	Svjetlana	Nedimović35	described	 in	stark	terms	the	disillusion	with	democratization	in	Bosnia	present	among	those	who	 took	part	 in	 the	demonstrations	 in	Tuzla	 and	other	 cities.	On	 top	of	 their	discontent	with	national	 institutions	has	come	 their	despair	with	regard	 to	 the	democratic	 deficit	 in	 international	 organizations	 present	 in	 the	 country.	Moreover,	 part	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 that	 triggered	 the	 unrest	was	 related	 to	diminishing	 international	aid	and	 the	retreat	of	organizations,	which	 took	with	them	the	jobs	that	they	had	created	earlier	(from	administrators	to	cleaners).	So	why	should	citizens	have	faith	in	policy	statements	issued	through	these	national	and	international	institutions?	What	is	remarkable	about	the	plenums	in	Bosnia	
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is	that	they	showed	that	many	people	still	believe	in	democracy	as	an	end	goal	–	even	they	are	fed	up	with	democratization	as	it	has	happened	so	far.		The	 Bosnian	 activists	 who	 were	 committed	 to	 the	 plenums	 have	understood	that	 to	start	restoring	democratic	 faith	 it’s	necessary	 to	step	out	of	the	 existing	 political	 order	 (even	 if	 only	 for	 a	 limited	 time)	 and	 reinvent	 the	democratic	process	in	a	way	that	reflects	deeper	democratic	hopes.	In	a	situation	where	 repetitive	 actions	 have	 led	 to	 few	 result,	 citizens	 need	 to	 see	 the	democratic	ideal	materialized;	only	in	this	way	they	can	keep	believing	that	the	ideal	 somewhere	 at	 the	 horizon	 still	 exists	 and	 is	 not	 just	 a	 mirage.	Anthropologist	Donald	Greaber	has	described	a	similar	process	in	the	run-up	to	Occupy	Wall	Street:	activists	had	tried	in	vain	to	use	traditional	linkage	methods	in	what	he	calls	“endless	attempts	to	kick	off	a	national	movement”36.	The	only	possibility	 left	 over	 was	 to	 persuade	 fellow	 citizens	 that	 a	 truly	 democratic	society	was	still	possible.	Graeber	describes	how	the	core	activists	realized	that	simply	 talking	 about	 this	would	not	 be	 sufficient.	“But	 it	was	possible	 to	 show	them.	 The	 experience	 of	 watching	 a	 group	 of	 a	 thousand,	 or	 two	 thousand	people,	 making	 collective	 decisions	 […]	 motivated	 only	 by	 principle	 and	solidarity,	 can	 change	 one’s	 fundamental	 assumptions	 about	 what	 politics	 […]	could	 actually	 be	 like.”	 	Such	 a	 moment	 of	 democratic	 imagination,	 or	 rather	imagining	democracy,	can	be	found	in	several	movements	now	that	have	faced	a	gridlock	in	the	political	order	or	experienced	a	complete	lack	of	responsiveness	of	 the	 political	 system.	 The	 G1000	 in	 Belgium	 in	 2011,	 a	 national	 citizens’	summit,	came	about	only	when	traditional	channels	for	political	participation	–	in	this	case,	the	federal	elections	of	2010	and	the	party	talks	about	institutional	reform	 that	 followed	 it	 –	had	 left	 the	 country	 stuck	 in	a	 situation	of	 seemingly	endless	government	negotiations37.	There	is	a	dialectic	relationship	between	the	far-off	democratic	ideal	and	its	practical	implementation	that	becomes	highly	visible	at	specific	moments	and	specific	 places,	 such	 as	 during	 the	 plenums,	 the	 G1000	 or	 the	 deliberative	meetings	 in	 Zucotti	 Park.	 The	 distant	 democratic	 ideal	 is	 what	 inspires	 the	concrete	manifestations	of	these	processes.	Even	if	they	are	short-lived	or	do	not	achieve	specific	policy	results,	they	have	given	an	inward	message	that	might	re-
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inspire	activists	and	a	message	to	the	outside	world	that	some	alternative	form	of	political	order	can	not	only	be	dreamed	of,	but	is	actually	realizable.		Of	 course,	 such	 initiatives	 have	 not	 remained	without	 serious	 criticism,	even	from	supporters.	One	complaint	with	regard	to	the	Occupy	movements,	for	example,	is	that	they	were,	as	Lawrence	Weschler	has	formulated	it,	“unable	(and	indeed	 intentionally,	 theoretically,	 insistently	 unwilling)	 to	 coalesce	 around	 a	unified	set	of	demands	that	might	in	turn	force	a	brace	of	legislative	ultimatums,	which	in	turn	might	set	the	stage	for	electoral	contests	with	the	horizon	of	any	sort	 of	 real	 contest	 for	 power”38.	 True	 as	 this	 is,	 deliberative	 settings	 like	 the	plenums	are	not	aimed	to	engage	people	in	the	power	struggle	of	elections;	they	want	to	realize	another	form	of	politics,	create	a	new	arena	and	make	that	into	the	“real	contest”.	They	aim	to	legitimize,	and	ultimately	give	power	to,	forms	of	democratic	participation	outside	elections.			
Conclusion	
	What	we	 have	 observed	 in	 Bosnia	 has	 implications	 for	 broader	 debates	 about	democracy	and	democratization.		Over	the	recent	years,	several	 instances	of	social	protest	 in	Europe	have	transformed	 into	 new	 initiatives	 for	 citizens'	 participation	 and	 experiments	 of	direct	 democracy.	 In	 Greece,	 for	 example,	 public	 squares	 became	 first	 sites	 of	protest	but	later	spaces	to	hold	popular	assemblies,	not	unlike	what	happened	in	Turkey	during	the	2013	protests	on	Gezi	Park	in	Istanbul.	In	Belgium	and	Ireland	citizens’	 summits,	 such	 as	 the	 G1000	 (Belgium	 2011)	 or	 the	 Constitutional	Convention	 (Ireland	 2013)	 became	 new	 large-scale	 forms	 of	 deliberative	democracy	 after	 episodes	 of	 crisis	 and	 protest.	 While	 still	 involving	parliamentary-like	 settings,	 these	 incident-driven	 forms	 of	 democracy	 were	attempts	to	reinvent	political	engagement	of	citizens	beyond	protest	and	outside	the	 classic	 institutions	 of	 representative	 democracy	 –	 often	 also	 outside	elections,	and	outside	the	realm	of	the	national	state,	or	at	least	in	response	to	a	heightened	 awareness	 of	 critical	 needs	 on	 the	 local,	 regional	 or	 global	 scale	outside	the	national	state	institutions.	These	instances	came	about	after	serious	strain	was	put	on	the	existing	political	system	in	these	countries,	sometimes	as	a	
	 17	
result	 of	 these	 countries’	 involvement	 in	 the	 global	 system.	 But	 rather	 than	entering	the	institutionalized	politics	of	strategic	bargaining	and	fixed	collective	preferences,	 citizens	 searched	 for	 new	 opportunities	 to	 engage	 with	 politics	through	their	voice,	their	arguments	and	narratives.	While	 many	 may	 deplore	 increasing	 citizen	 disengagement	 from	 and	disillusionment	with	 the	 formal	 structures	 of	 representative	 democracy	 or	 the	lack	 of	 enthusiasm	 of	 citizens	 for	 elections	 and	 political	 parties	 in	 a	democratizing	 state	 (or	 these	 citizens’	 interest	 in	 political	 parties	 only	 for	reasons	 of	 clientelism	 and	 personal	 gain),	 it	 is	 exactly	 such	 frustration,	disengagement	and	disillusionment	that	may	be	the	beginning	of	an	alternative	form	of	democratic	engagement.	Incident-driven	civic	actions	and	spaces	can	let	people	 experience	 democracy	 in	 new	 ways	 and	 set	 it	 as	 an	 example	 to	populations	who	do	not	live	in	a	democracy	yet.	This	is	exactly	what	happened	in	the	case	of	the	Bosnian	plenums	in	2014.	These	actions	reified,	even	if	only	for	a	brief	moment,	 a	 possible	 political	 future.	 In	 a	 state	where	 classical	 recipes	 for	democratization	 have	 failed,	 they	 were	 a	 visible	 instigator	 of	 further	democratization.	They	were	a	bold	stride	towards	a	democratic	model	that	still	needs	to	be	created.			__________________	An	earlier	version	of	this	article	was	presented	at	the	22nd	International	Conference	of	Europeanists,	Council	of	European	Studies,	Paris,	Sciences	Po,	July	8	-	10,	2015.	The	authors	would	like	to	thank	the	participants	of	the	panel	on	“Innovations	in	Democratic	Governance:	The	Role	of	Crises	and	Incidents”	for	their	comments	and	reflections.																																																												
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